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INTERRING THE IMMIGRATION RULE OF LENITY
Patrick J. Glen
ABSTRACT
The immigration rule of lenity has haunted immigration
jurisprudence since its initial iteration in 1947. But as with any
spectral entity, its existence is more ephemeral than real. The rule
was meant to be a tie-breaker of sorts, a canon that where a
provision of the immigration laws was ambiguous, the courts should
impose the more lenient construction. It has never, however, been
the dispositive basis for a holding of the Supreme Court. Rather, to
the extent it has been referenced, it has been trotted out only as a
rhetorical device to sanction a decision reached on other grounds.
Even this rhetorical role has been called into question with the
advent of Chevron deference. The raison d’etre of the rule was to
provide the basis of decision when the court was confronted with
two equally plausible interpretations of a statutory provision.
Chevron now fills that gap, and there seems no room left for the
immigration rule of lenity in modern administrative law. Rather
than continue to allow this outmoded rule of decision to stalk
argumentation in immigration cases, the Supreme Court should
simply euthanize and inter the rule at the earliest opportunity.
INTRODUCTION
Reviewing briefs filed before the Supreme Court in immigration cases over the past decade,
one could be forgiven for believing that the so-called “immigration rule of lenity” is a vibrant and
integral component of the Court’s approach to statutory interpretation. It has been raised to argue,
inter alia, that a second controlled-substance possession conviction may be a “drug trafficking
crime” under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) only where the prosecutor has sought
and obtained a recidivist enhancement;1 that tax crimes are categorically excluded from the INA’s
provision relating to criminal offenses involving fraud or deceit;2 that a state statute must contain
a jurisdictional element in order for the offense to correspond to a federal analog; 3 that whatever
1

See Pet. Br. 38-40, Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010) (No. 09-60); see also 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)(B) (“The term ‘aggravated felony’ means—illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in
section 802 of Title 21), including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18”); 18 U.S.C.
924(c)(2) (“the term ‘drug trafficking crime’ means any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (21
U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or chapter 705 of title
46”).
2
See Pet. Br. 45-47, Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478 (2012) (No. 10-577); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)
(“The term ‘aggravated felony’ means—an offense that (i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or
victims exceeds $10,000; or (ii) is described in section 7201 of Title 26 (relating to tax evasion) in which the revenue
loss to the Government exceeds $10,000”).
3
See Pet. Br. 44-46, Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619 (2016) (No. 14-1096); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(E)(i)
(“The term ‘aggravated felony’ means—an offense described in [section 844(i)]” of Title 18); 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)
(providing, inter alia, that “[w]hoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means
of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate commerce or in any
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else “sexual abuse of a minor” may mean, it does not include statutory rape offenses in states where
the age of consent is sixteen or seventeen;4 and that a charging document that omits the “time and
place” of the alien’s initial removal hearing should not trigger the cessation of continuous physical
presence for purposes of establishing eligibility for cancellation of removal.5
The rule, first enunciated in the late 1940s, is framed as a tie-breaking rule of strict
construction: when a provision of the INA can be read in two plausible ways, a reviewing court is
bound to adopt the less restrictive or harsh reading of the statute.6 In other words, in cases of
doubt, that doubt should be resolved in line with the interpretation that would entail the least
adverse consequences for the alien facing deportation or seeking relief from removal.7 The
problem is, however, that although frequently invoked by the immigration-bar and often paid lipservice to by the Supreme Court itself, the rule has never done significant work in interpreting the
immigration laws. It has invariably been a tool of absolute last resort, brought to the table of
decision only once an interpretation has been settled upon and invoked only as a final justification
in support of a construction already sufficiently supported by traditional tools of interpretation.
Even assuming the rule has done work in the past, however, its irrelevance in a post-Chevron
world is clear; if there are two plausible interpretations of a statutory provision, the agency’s must
control so long as reasonable and permissible, and regardless of whether another interpretation is
in some sense “better” or preferred by the reviewing court.
This article seeks to fill the role of Antony: “I come to bury” the immigration rule of lenity,
“not to praise” it.8 The Supreme Court should, at the earliest opportunity, inter the rule as the
anachronism it is. As already stated, it is questionable as to whether the rule has ever played
anything but a rhetorical role in the decisions of the Supreme Court. But whatever its historical
legacy may be, it has no further service to pay in the deference-oriented world of the modern
administrative state. The Chevron framework establishes the appropriate tie-breaking mechanism
activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be imprisoned for not less than 5 years and not more than 20
years, fined under this title, or both”).
4
See Pet. Br. 38-40, Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017) (No. 16-54); see also 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)(A) (“The term ‘aggravated felony’ means—murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor”).
5
See Pet. Br. 44-48, Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018) (No. 17-459); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (“In
removal proceedings under section 1229a of this title, written notice (in this section referred to as a ‘notice to appear’)
shall be given in person to the alien … specifying” certain information, including “[t]he time and place at which the
proceedings will be held.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2) (requiring 7 years continuous residence for an alien previously
admitted for lawful permanent residency to establish eligibility for cancellation of removal); 8 U.S.C. §
1229b(b)(1)(A) (requiring 10 years continuous physical presence in the United States for a nonpermanent resident
alien); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) (“any period of continuous residence or continuous physical presence in the United
States shall be deemed to end … when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a) of this title”); see
generally Patrick J. Glen & Alanna R. Kennedy, The Strange and Unexpected Afterlife of Pereira v. Sessions, 34 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 24-28 (2019).
6
See Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (“[Since the stakes are considerable for the individual, we will
not assume that Congress meant to trench on his freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest possible
meanings of the words used); see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (charactering the rule as a
“principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien”) (citations omitted).
7
See, e.g., Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S. at 10 (“We resolve the doubts in favor of that construction because deportation
is a drastic measure and at time the equivalent of banishment or exile.”) (citing Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S.
388 (1947)); see also INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966) (“Even if there was some doubt as to the correct
construction of the statute, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the alien.”).
8
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, Act III, Scene II.
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for agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions, and the immigration rule of lenity
has no work to do within that framework and no relevance outside it.
This article proceeds in three Parts. Part I traces the formative years of the rule, its initial
genesis and the Supreme Court’s subsequent refinements. This part demonstrates the shaky
foundations of the rule in cases where there was no serious debate over the scope of the proper
interpretation of the statute. In other words, the rule is developed not only in cases where it plays
no role in decision, but in cases where the parties and the Court itself were more or less on the
same page regarding how the statute should be interpreted. This shaky foundation is not solidified
by the Court’s subsequent “refinements” of the rule, and in any event, the rule continued to play
only an adjunct role to decisions through the late 1950s. Part II advances the time-line to 1964,
with the first subsection addressing the two most significant post-1958, pre-Chevron, decisions
presenting the issue. Although a closer call, these cases too provide little indication of a meaty
role for lenity. The second subsection heralds the advent of Chevron and its application in
immigration cases, with the third subsection then proceeding to the Supreme Court’s post-Chevron
lenity decisions. Finally, Part III addresses the question of what role lenity could play in
contemporary administrative law. This part begins by reviewing the rule of strict-construction of
penal statutes, i.e., the criminal or traditional “rule of lenity.” This review provides a baseline of
sorts for how lenity may operate in the immigration context, but it is also tempered by the strictures
of Chevron. Thus, this part proceeds to assess the question of how or why lenity could operate
within the Chevron framework. It concludes that whether at step-one or step-two, lenity is out of
place, while also rejecting a proposed “outside-Chevron” role for lenity. In the end, however, this
part concludes that the death of lenity should be of little moment; the concerns that animated lenity
are more or less safeguarded by the Chevron framework. Under Chevron as under lenity, there is
no risk that aliens will be subject to arbitrary, capricious, or irrational interpretations of the
immigration laws.
I. GENESIS AND REFINEMENT: THE RULE OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION, 1947-1958
This Part traces the origins of the immigration rule of lenity from the late 1940s to the late
1950s, essentially the “foundational” period for the rule. In some ways, this temporal scope is
arbitrary; structurally, this Part could also fold in the two cases from the 1960s discussed infra,
and frame the question as effectively two periods set off by the advent of Chevron deference in
1984. The instant framing makes sense for two reasons. First, the foundational period is on the
whole concerned with statutory provisions that pre-date the enactment of the Immigration and
Nationality Act in 1952. It thus makes sense to treat this class of cases separately from the cases
that implicate the rule and began to arise in the 1960s. The unifying characteristic of Part II of this
article is the law to be applied, and a similar point could be made about this Part. Second, the rule
was “accepted” to a larger degree by 1964. This section is not concerned with application of an
accepted rule, but with tracing the origins of that rule—why and how it arose and was given shape
by the early decisions applying it. Accordingly, the framing in Parts I and II does have much to
recommend it, even if it could be presented in a different grouping.
Subsection A presents the origins of the immigration rule of lenity in the doctrine of strict
construction announced by the Supreme Court in Delgadillo v. Carmichael and Fong Haw Tan v.
Phelan. But as that section notes, from the very beginning the rule was on shaky footing—it was
3

an adjunct to normal tools of statutory construction that played little role in either decision, the
interpretations adopted by the Court in both cases were not meaningfully contested by the parties
making resort to the rule unnecessary, the statement of the rule was in tension with its related-rule,
that of strict construction of penal statutes, and the entire development of the rule can be laid at
the feet of Justice Douglas, whose creation of the rule was more rhetorical than substantive,
deriving from a contestable view of the nature of deportation proceedings. Subsection B carries
the historical review from 1950 through 1958, in a trio of decisions—one rejecting application of
the rule, and two raising the rule in the course of rendering a statutory interpretation that ultimately
favored the alien. As this section concludes, however, the same pre-1950 flaws are present in these
cases. Most importantly, the rule continued to play no apparent role in the decision of these cases.
To the extent the rule was noted by majorities in two of the cases, traditional tools of statutory
construction had proven sufficient to resolve the case even prior to invoking lenity. The
foundational period thus introduces a strain that unifies cases as disparate as 1947’s Delgadillo
and 2001’s INS v. St. Cyr: the immigration rule of lenity is a rhetorical device, not a substantive
rule of decision.
A. Genesis: Delgadillo and Fong Haw Tan
Delgadillo was a Mexican citizen who lawfully entered the United States in 1923 and
resided here through June 1942.9 That same month, he shipped out from Los Angeles on a
merchant ship for an intercoastal voyage to New York City via the Panama Canal.10 Unfortunately,
the ship was torpedoed sometime after exiting the Panama Canal, and Delgadillo was rescued and
taken to Cuba.11 After one week of recuperation at the United States consulate in Cuba, he returned
to the United States through Miami, Florida, where he resumed his service as a merchant seaman.12
This idyll was upended in March 1944, however, when Delgadillo was convicted of second-degree
robbery in California and sentenced to one year to life imprisonment.13 On the basis of that
conviction, he was charged with deportability as an “alien who is hereafter sentenced to
imprisonment for a term of one year or more because of a conviction in this country of a crime
involving moral turpitude, committed within five years after entry of the alien to the United
States[.]”14
The immigration officer, affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals, sustained the
charge of removability, concluding that Delgadillo’s arrival in Miami in June 1942 constituted an
entry into the United States.15 A district court granted a writ of habeas corpus, but the Ninth Circuit
reversed, upholding the agency determination.16 The Ninth Circuit noted language in prior
Supreme Court opinions that characterized the term “entry” as broad and relating to any coming
or going of an alien into the United States. The Supreme Court had stated, for instance, that “[t]he
word ‘entry’ by its own force implies a coming from outside. The context shows that in order that
there be an entry within the meaning of the act there must be an arrival from some foreign port or
9

Delgadillo, 332 U.S. at 389.
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
Id. at 389-90.
14
8 U.S.C. § 155(a) (1940); Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, c.29, 39 Stat. 874, § 19(a).
15
See Delguerico v. Delgadillo, 159 F.2d 130, 132 (9th Cir. 1947).
16
Id.at 131.
10
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place.”17 Broader still, that Court had opined that “the word ‘entry’ … includes any coming of an
alien from a foreign country into the United States whether such coming be the first or any
subsequent one.”18 Applying these precedents, the court of appeals found the question of the
voluntariness of landing on foreign soil, thus necessitating an entry into the United States,
“immaterial in considering whether his return to this country constitutes an ‘entry’ within the
Immigration Act.”19 The Ninth Circuit noted that it had already rejected that argument in a similar
case presenting a shipwreck, a rescue entailing time spent in a foreign country, and a return to the
United States, holding that such a return constituted an “entry” for immigration purposes.20 The
court also emphasized that it was not the wreck and entry itself that subjected Delgadillo to
immigration consequences, but his subsequent conviction for a criminal offense: “The
Government is not asking that appellee be deported because the exigencies of war forced him to
land in Cuba. Appellee is being deported because, within five years after his entry, he was
convicted of robbery.”21
The Supreme Court reversed. Although it recognized that the cases relied on by the Ninth
Circuit did ostensibly lend support to the court of appeals’ holding, it also distinguished those
cases as presenting circumstances “where the alien plainly expected or planned to enter a foreign
port or place.”22 Delgadillo, in contrast, “was catapulted into the ocean, rescued, and taken to
Cuba. He had no part in selecting the foreign port as his destination. His itinerary was forced on
him by wholly fortuitous circumstances.”23 Deeming his return to the United States an “entry”
within the meaning of the immigration laws would give that term a “capricious application.”24 The
Court noted approvingly the then-recent decision of Judge Learned Hand in Di Pasquale v.
Karnuth.25 In that case, an alien had boarded a train in Buffalo bound for Detroit, that unbeknownst
to him passed through Canada.26 The alien lacked a valid immigrant visa, and so on the train’s
“return” to the United States he was charged with deportability.27 Judge Hand held, however, that
the alien did not make an entry when the train returned to the United States, relying on the inability
of the alien to effect any change in that route or to voluntarily assent to departure from the United
States.28 In Judge Hand’s view, “[c]aprice in the incidence of punishment is one of the indicia of
tyranny, and nothing can be more disingenuous than to say that deportation in these circumstances
is not punishment. It is well that we should be free to rid ourselves of those who abuse our
hospitality; but it is more important that the continued enjoyment of that hospitality once granted,
shall not be subject to meaningless and irrational hazards.”29

17

United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U.S. 398, 401 (1929).
United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422, 425 (1933) (emphasis added).
19
Delgadillo, 159 F.2d at 132.
20
See Taguchi v. Carr, 62 F.2d 307, 308 (9th Cir. 1932) (“we are compelled to hold that, notwithstanding the
misfortune which befell appellant, he was coming from a foreign country and therefore was subject to the immigration
laws the same as though he had never resided in the United States.”).
21
Delgadillo, 159 F.2d at 133.
22
Delgadillo, 332 U.S. at 390.
23
Ibid.
24
Id. at 391.
25
158 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1947).
26
Id. at 878.
27
Ibid.
28
Id. at 878-79.
29
Id. at 879.
18
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The Supreme Court concurred in this notion in rejecting the court of appeals’ view that
Delgadillo had effected an “entry” in 1942, opining that “[d]eportation can be the equivalent of
banishment or exile.”30 And so the rule of strict construction was given its first iteration: “We will
not attribute to Congress a purpose to make his right to remain here dependent on circumstances
so fortuitous and capricious as those upon which the Immigration Service has here seized. The
hazards to which we are now asked to subject the alien are too irrational to square with the statutory
scheme.”31
The Supreme Court returned to the issue one year later in a case presenting a variation on
the “crime involving moral turpitude” ground of deportation.32 Along with a single conviction for
a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years of entry, the 1917 Act also provided
for the deportation of “any alien who, after May 1, 1917, … is sentenced more than once to [a term
of one year or more] of imprisonment because of conviction in this country of any crime involving
moral turpitude, committed at any time after entry[.]”33 Fong Haw Tan, a Chinese national and
citizen, was convicted of two murders in a two-count indictment, and sentenced in one judgment
to a period of life imprisonment.34 He was subsequently paroled for purposes of being taken into
custody by the immigration service, and was then charged with deportability under § 19(a) based
on his convictions.35 Fong Haw Tan sought habeas relief, arguing that “he [w]as sentenced but
once, and hence, having resided here more than five years before the crimes were committed, he
is not subject to deportation.”36 The district court denied issuance of the writ, as did the Ninth
Circuit, which relied on its extant precedent holding that “[t]he purpose of Congress [in enacting
the crime involving moral turpitude provision] undoubtedly was to provide for the deportation of
a man who committed more than one offense involving moral turpitude for which he had been
convicted and upon which conviction has been imposed; whether the sentence run concurrently or
consecutively is entirely immaterial from the standpoint of the purpose of the law.”37 In essence,
two offense qualified under the statute, regardless of how the sentence is itself imposed, so long
as the alien has been convicted of both offenses.38
Interpretation of this clause of § 19(a) implicated a multi-pronged conflict amongst the
courts of appeals. Along with the Ninth Circuit, the First Circuit had concluded that conviction
for any two crimes brings the alien within the purview of § 19(a), regardless of whether the acts
are in one criminal scheme and regardless of how the sentence is imposed.39 The Second Circuit
had held that two convictions qualify under the statute when the sentences imposed run

30

Delgadillo, 332 U.S. at 391 (citing Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945)).
Ibid.
32
Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S. 6.
33
8 U.S.C. § 155(a) (1940); Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, c.29, 39 Stat. 874, § 19(a).
34
Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S. at 8.
35
Ibid.; see 8 U.S.C. § 155(a) (providing that an alien covered by this provision “shall, upon the warrant of the Attorney
General, be taken into custody and deported”).
36
Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 162 F.2d 663, 664 (9th Cir. 1947).
37
Nishimoto v. Nagle, 44 F.2d 304, 306 (9th Cir. 1930).
38
Fong Haw Tan, 162 F.2d at 666 (“there is no harsh injustice involved that justifies a judicial search for a limitation
of the plainly expressed scope of the statute. Within five years of entry, one base act of the alien ends permissive stay;
after five years two base acts ends it.”).
39
See Clark v. Orabona, 59 F.2d 187, 189 (1st Cir. 1932) (alien deportable where acts arose out of the same criminal
scheme, two indictments were entered, and two sentences imposed); Nishimoto, 44 F.2d at 306 (similar).
31
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consecutively, but not when the sentences run concurrently.40 The Fourth Circuit had held that the
two crimes for which the alien is convicted must arise out of distinct criminal transactions, but if
that condition is met it is not relevant how the sentences are imposed, i.e., concurrently or
consecutively.41 Finally, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the convictions must be based on distinct
criminal incidents subject to distinct sentencing, i.e., the statute contemplated multiple sentencings
for multiple crimes occurring at different points in time.42
The Supreme Court ultimately adopted the Fifth Circuit’s view. Relying largely on
legislative history, which seemed to support the view that Congress was concerned with recidivist
offenders, the Court held that § 19(a) “authorize[s] deportation only where an alien having
committed a crime involving moral turpitude and having been convicted and sentenced, once again
commits a crime of that nature and is convicted and sentenced for it.”43 Having resolved the issue
based on the language of the statute and legislative history and intent, the Court nonetheless went
on to opine that “[w]e resolve the doubts in favor of that construction because deportation is a
drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile.”44 Developing the principle as
announced in Delgadillo, the Court concluded that “since the stakes are considerable for the
individual, we will not assume that Congress meant to trench on his freedom beyond that which is
required by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used.”45
So was the immigration rule of lenity begotten. Contemporary cases, as well as advocates,
return especially to Fong Haw Tan to ground invocation of the rule. But these cases provide at
best a shaky foundation for a robust command that ambiguities in deportation statutes must be
resolved in favor of the alien. In this regard, at least four points bear mentioning.
First, in these cases, as with a fair reading of every decision in which the rule has been
invoked, application of lenity was not necessary. In Delgadillo, the Supreme Court properly noted
that it had not previously addressed the voluntariness of departure in assessing whether an alien
made a subsequent “entry” into the United States. Although its cases could be read to support a
broad construction of the term “entry,” the Court ultimately determined that the better
interpretation of that language would account for the nature of the alien’s departure from the
United States. This common-sense interpretation was imposed prior to resort to any strictconstruction canon. In Fong Haw Tan, the issue was resolved by construing the statutory language
in conjunction with the legislative history, which indicates that Congress sought to target repeat
40

See United States ex rel. Mignozzi v. Day, 51 F.2d 1019, 1020 (2d Cir. 1931) (concurrent sentences do not meet the
requirement, even if entered for distinct offenses); Johnson v. United States ex rel. Pepe, 28 F.2d 810, 811-12 (2d Cir.
1928) (single indictment for multiple offenses where sentences are imposed consecutively qualifies).
41
See Tassari v. Schmucker, 53 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1931) (“In our opinion the correct principle to be deduced
from these decisions is that where the crimes are separate and distinct and there is a separate sentence for each offense
it must be held within the meaning of the act that the alien has been ‘sentenced more than once’ even though the
separate sentences are made to run concurrently and not consecutively.”).
42
See Wallis v. Tecchio, 65 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir. 1933) (“The alien is sentenced once when, after a conviction or
plea of guilty, he is called before the bar and receives judgment, whether for one or several crimes, with one or several
terms of imprisonment. He is sentenced more than once when that happens again.”); see alsoOpolich v. Fluckey, 47
F.2d 950, 950 (N.D. Ga. 1930) (“[I]n my opinion Congress has in mind what are commonly called ‘repeaters,’ that is
to say, persons who commit a crime and are sentenced, and then commit another and are sentenced again.”).
43
Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S. at 9-10.
44
Id. at 10 (citing Delgadillo, 332 U.S. 388).
45
Id. at 10.
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criminal offenders who engaged in multiple, distinct criminal transactions. Only after resolving
the question in favor of this interpretation, and by using traditional tools of statutory construction,
did the Court then opine that any doubts, if still held, should be resolved in favor of that
interpretation in light of the rule of strict construction. But upon application of the traditional
interpretive tools, there were no remaining doubts.
Second, a corollary to the first point, in both cases the government either agreed with the
interpretation adopted by the Supreme Court or declined to defend the harsher interpretation
adopted by the court of appeals. In Delgadillo, the government, consistent also with the Supreme
Court, recognized that a strict and literal application of the text of the statute could support the
Ninth Circuit’s decision.46 But it declined to press that interpretation: “[u]pon reconsideration …
we are inclined to suggest that the Congress may not have intended that an ‘entry’ for the purposes
of the immigration laws should be predicated upon a genuinely involuntary departure from the
United States, i.e., an involuntary going to a foreign port or place.”47 In the government’s view,
the Supreme Court’s prior decisions did not foreclose this interpretation, it was consistent with the
general principle that consequences should not be attached to involuntary acts, and the agency had
itself in other circumstances concluded that where the alien had no control over the departure there
was no subsequent entry upon return.48 For instance, when an alien service-member was deployed
abroad with the armed forces, he was not deemed to effect an “entry” when returned, since the
departure was not within his control. The government submitted that “[i]t seems to us that this
ruling is clearly sound in recognizing that such departure and return of an alien servicemember is
a matter completely beyond his control. In principle, we are unable to distinguish an involuntary
landing in a foreign country resulting from a torpedoing or shipwreck from the situation of the
alien in the armed forces.”49
Likewise, in Fong Haw Tan, the government declined to defend the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of the statute, and instead argued that the Fourth Circuit’s construction was the
preferred view.50 Contra the Ninth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation required that the
crimes arise from distinct criminal transactions, although sentencing could occur in a single
proceeding and be imposed either concurrently or consecutively.51 The Supreme Court did not
adopt this view in whole, but the interpretation it did adopt was similar: the decision adopted the
Fifth Circuit’s view, which required not only that the offenses arise from distinct criminal
transactions, but that the sentencings had to be separate, i.e., the alien had to be brought twice
before the court for purposes of sentencing.52 Thus, in Delgadillo there was no adversarial posture
regarding the interpretation of “entry” ultimately adopted by the Court; the alien and government
46

Brief for Respondent 7-8, Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388 (1947) (No. 63).
Id. at 20.
48
Id.at 20, 23.
49
Id. at 23.
50
Brief for Respondent 28-29, Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6 (1948) (No. 370).
51
See supra note 41.
52
Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S. at 8-9; compare Tassari, 53 F.2d at 573 (4th Cir.) (“In our opinion the correct principle to
be deduced from these decisions is that where the crimes are separate and distinct and there is a separate sentence for
each offense it must be held within the meaning of the act that the alien has been ‘sentenced more than once’ even
though the separate sentences are made to run concurrently and not consecutively.”), with Wallis, 65 F.2d at 252 (5th
Cir.) (“The alien is sentenced once when, after a conviction or plea of guilty, he is called before the bar and receives
judgment, whether for one or several crimes, with one or several terms of imprisonment. He is sentenced more than
once when that happens again.”).
47
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agreed on a voluntariness requirement and that interpretation was itself in accord with agency
views. And in Fong Haw Tan, there was little adversarial posture; the views of the parties and
Court ultimately aligned to a high degree, nobody defended the broad interpretation adopted by
the Ninth Circuit, and although the Court’s interpretation was narrower than that proffered by the
government, under either Fong Haw Tan would not have been deportable.53
Third, although appearing in two unanimous decisions of the Supreme Court, the
immigration rule of lenity seems less a court-driven jurisprudential development than a Justice
Douglas rhetorical crusade. Justice Douglas wrote the opinion for the Court in both Delgadillo
and Fong Haw Tan, and the initial precedential “hook” for his opinion in Delgadillo was his own
prior opinion in Bridges v. Wixon. In that case, Justice Douglas wrote that “[t]hough deportation
is not technically a criminal proceeding, it visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives
him of the right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom. That deportation is a penalty—
at times a most serious one—cannot be doubted.”54 This characterization of deportation was and
is, at the least, contestable. Both before and after Bridges and the subsequent development of the
immigration rule of lenity, Supreme Court decisions have declined to characterize deportation as
punishment, a penalty, exile, or banishment.55 To the extent Justice Douglas disagreed and wrote
competing language into controlling opinions of the Supreme Court, those specific views, never
relevant to the actual disposition of the case in which they were raised, should be taken with a
grain of salt.
Finally, the Court’s framing of the rule of strict construction for immigration purposes was
contrary to contemporary statements of the rule of strict construction. In fact, the case occurring
immediately after Fong Haw Tan in the Supreme Court reports, United States v. Brown,
specifically rejected the contention that the rule of strict construction requires the narrowest
possible reading of statutory language.56 The issue in Brown arose under the Federal Escape Act,
which defined scape from “any penal or correctional institution” as a federal criminal offense in
qualifying circumstances, and imposed a sentence “in addition to and independent of any sentence
imposed in the case in connection with which such person is held in custody at the time of such
escape or attempt to escape. If such person be under sentence at the time of such offense, the
sentence imposed hereunder shall begin upon the expiration of, or upon legal release from, any
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sentence under which such person is held at the time of such escape or attempt to escape.”57
Brown was serving the first of three sentences that had been imposed, to run consecutively, when
he escaped and was subsequently convicted under the Act. The question in the case was when did
the sentence for the escape begin to run—at the end of the first, one year sentence, that he was
serving at the time of escape, or at the end of the five year aggregate term to which he had been
sentenced?58 The Supreme Court held that the sentence under the Escape Act did not begin to run
until the completion of the total terms of imprisonment the defendant was serving at the time of
the escape, and in doing so rejected the argument that the rule of strict construction required it to
adopt a more lenient interpretation.59 “The canon in favor of strict construction is not an inexorable
command to override common sense and evident statutory purpose. It does not require a magnified
emphasis upon a single ambiguous word in order to give it a meaning contradictory to the fair
import of the whole remaining language.”60 Moreover, the rule does not “demand that a statute be
given the ‘narrowest meaning’; it is satisfied if the words are given their fair meaning in accord
with the manifest intent of the lawmakers.”61 It is difficult, if not impossible, to square this
understanding of the rule of strict construction with Justice Douglas’s view as expressed in Fong
Haw Tan. The major difference between Brown and Fong Haw Tan is more prosaic: Justice
Douglas was in dissent in Brown and unable to import his whims into the dicta of the Court’s
opinion.
B. Refinement and Application, 1950-1958
Between 1950 and 1958, the immigration rule of lenity was referenced on at least three
occasions, with varying results for the alien. In Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, the Supreme Court
was called upon to decide whether an alien could be deported after being denaturalized, based on
convictions incurred while he was a citizen.62 Eichenlaub was naturalized in 1936, but in 1941 he
was convicted of violating the Espionage Act of 1917 and sentenced to 18 months’
imprisonment.63 In 1944, he was denaturalized “by consent” based on alleged fraud in the
procurement of his naturalization.64 Following denaturalization, deportation proceedings were
instituted, where he was charged with deportability based on his criminal conviction. The relevant
provision provided for the deportability of “[a]ll aliens who since August 1, 1914, have been or
may hereafter be convicted of any violation or conspiracy to violate any of the following Acts or
parts of Acts, the judgment on such conviction having become final, namely:” the Espionage Act
of 1917.65
On a 4—3 vote, with Justices Douglas and Clark not participating, the Supreme Court
upheld application of this provision to Eichenlaub, rejecting the argument that he could not be
deported based on a conviction entered while he was a naturalized citizen. According to the
majority, the language of the statute requires “that all persons to be deported under this Act shall
57
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be ‘aliens.’ [It] do[es] not limit its scope to aliens who never have been naturalized. [It] do[es]
not exempt those who have secured certificates of naturalization, but then have lost them by court
order on the ground of fraud in their procurement. [It] do[es] not suggest that such persons are not
as clearly ‘aliens’ as they were before their fraudulent naturalization.”66 The majority saw the case
as simple—Eichenlaub was an alien who was convicted of an offense in the deportation statute,
and was thus deportable. For this reason, “there [wa]s no occasion to restrict [the] language [of
the statute] so as to narrow its plain meaning.” The majority recognized the substantial issue
presented by the case, as “whether the Act requires that the relators not only must have been ‘aliens
at the times when they were ordered deported, but … also have had that status at the times when
they were convicted of designated offenses against the national security.”67 But the statute did not
require by its plain terms alienage at the time of conviction; it was triggered when two conditions
precedent were met, a conviction for a relevant offense and alienage.68 “When both conditions are
met and, after hearing, the Attorney General finds them to be undesirable residents of the United
States, the Act is satisfied.”69 The majority finally buttressed this plain language interpretation by
reference to legislative intent. The intent of Congress had been to deport undesirable aliens
convicted of crimes against national security, and there was no indication that Congress would
have wanted to distinguish between naturalized citizens and aliens when deciding whether to
deport an alien following his denaturalization.70
Justice Frankfurter dissented, however, joined by Justices Black and Jackson. In Justice
Frankfurter’s view, the immigration rule of lenity should have provided the rule of decision: “I
deem it my duty not to squeeze [the language of the statute] so as to yield every possible hardship
of which its words are susceptible.”71 The dissent would have held that the statute “should be read
to apply only to one who was an alien when convicted and should not be made to apply to persons
in the position of these petitioners,” i.e., denaturalized citizens whose convictions were entered
while citizens.72 This interpretation of the statute was plausible and reasonable, and so for Justice
Frankfurter the question came down to the consequences the competing interpretations entailed.73
“Where, as here, a statute permits either of two constructions without violence to language, the
construction which leads to hardship should be rejected in favor of the permissible construction
consonant with humane considerations.”74
In Barber v. Gonzales, decided four years later, the Court returned to the question of how
the term “entry” should be applied.75 Gonzales was born a national of the United States in preindependence Philippines.76 He entered the United States in 1930, prior to independence, and had
not departed since.77 In 1941 he was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and sentenced to
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one year imprisonment, and in 1950 he was convicted of second degree burglary and given an
indeterminate sentence with a two-year minimum.78 Based on these convictions, Gonzales was
charged with deportability as an alien convicted of more than one crime involving moral turpitude
after entry, for which a sentence of 1-year or more had been imposed.79 Gonzales filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he had not made an “entry” to the United States within
the meaning of § 19(a), since he had not come from a foreign territory or port.80 The district court
denied the writ, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and ordered Gonzales’s release from detention.81
The Supreme Court granted review to consider “whether [Gonzales]—who was born a
national of the United States in the Philippine Islands, who came to the continental United States
as a national prior to the Philippine Independence Act of 1934 … may not be deported under §
19(a) of the Immigration Act of 1917.”82 The government largely based its argument on the
Philippine Independence Act of 1934, which provided that “[f]or the purposes of the Immigration
Act of 1917,… this section, and all other laws of the United States relating to the immigration,
exclusion, or expulsion of aliens, citizens of the Philippines Islands who are not citizens of the
United States shall be considered as if they were aliens.”83 According to the government, although
Gonzales was a national upon his entry to the United States, the independence of the Philippines
and the conditions under which that independence was granted, negated that status.84 Since he was
not a citizen of the United States, he should be considered an alien, and thus subject to removal
based on his convictions.85
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding that it was premised on a fundamental
misapprehension relating to whether Gonzales had ever made an “entry” within the meaning of
§ 19(a).86 Although in common parlance Gonzales made an entry into the United States when he
arrived in 1930, “some terms acquire a special technical meaning by a process of judicial
construction,” and the majority found “entry” to be one of those words.87 Examining its precedent,
the Court read entry as requiring “an arrival from some foreign port or place.”88 In 1930, when
Gonzales entered the United States, “he was not arriving ‘from some foreign port or place.’ On
the contrary, he was a United States national moving from one of our insular possessions to the
mainland.”89 The Court’s holding was premised on its view of the “well-settled meaning of
‘entry,’”90 but it also referenced the rule of strict construction.91 This reference, however, only
serves to clarify the textual and precedential basis for the Court’s decision: “[i]n the absence of
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explicit language showing a contrary congressional intent, we must give technical words in
deportation statutes their usual technical meaning.”92 In other words, Congress was free to alter
the meaning of “entry” that had developed through judicial decisions, but until it did so the Court
would continue to apply its traditional interpretation of the term.
Justice Minton dissented, joined by Justices Reed and Burton. The disagreement centered
on what exactly the “well-settled” meaning of “entry” was. The dissent maintained that “entry”
should be given its “ordinary meaning,”93 and that nothing in the legislative history or the Court’s
own precedents “‘reveals [anything] sufficient to indicate that Congress did not intend the word
‘entry’ in section 19 should have its ordinary meaning.’”94 The dissent found the invocation of
lenity especially inapt: “I know of no good reason why we should by strained construction of an
Act compel the United States to cling onto alien criminals. It is not the public policy of this country
to construe its statutes strictly in favor of alien criminals whose convictions have already been
established of record.”95
The Court returned to the definition of “entry” in Bonetti v. Rogers, capping this
foundational period in the rule’s history.96 Under the Internal Security Act of 1950, any “alien
who had been a member of the Communist Party of the United States after entry into the United
States” was deportable.97 Bonetti first entered the United States in 1923, became a dues-paying
member of the Communist Party in 1932, but left the party in 1936.98 In 1937, he abandoned his
residence in the United States to fight in the Spanish Civil War, but was readmitted in October
1938 as a quota immigrant.99 He was not at that time a member of the Communist Party, nor had
he joined the Party after entry.100 Nonetheless, in 1951, after passage of the 1950 Act, deportation
proceedings were instituted based on his earlier membership, he was found deportable, and both
the district court and court of appeals affirmed that determination.101
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court agreed that the 1950 Act was meant to target
aliens who were Communist Party members at the time of their admission, or those who became
members at any point after their admission.102 The disagreement centered on what entry counted
for purposes of applying the provision: Bonetti argued that it was the 1938 entry that was relevant
for assessing his deportability,103 while the government argued that any entry may qualify, and that
for purposes of assessing his deportability it was fair to use the 1923 entry as the relevant entry.104
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The majority deemed the 1938 entry the relevant entry in this “novel factual situation,”105 so
concluding because it was the status granted in October 1938 that the government sought to annul
via deportation.106 Since Bonetti was not at that time a member of the Communist Party, and had
not joined at any time since, he was not deportable.107 Although the language of the 1950 Act was
“quite ambiguous in their application to the question here presented, we believe that our
interpretation of them is the only fair and reasonable construction that their cloudy provisions will
permit under the rare and novel facts of this case.”108 And, of course, the Court recognized that it
could not “ ‘assume that Congress meant to trench on [an alien’s] freedom beyond that which is
required by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used.’”109
Justice Clark, joined by Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, dissented, and would have held
against the alien based on the plain text of the statute. The legislative intent behind the 1950 Act
was to broadly encompass any alien who was a member of the Communist Party at the time of or
after any entry to the United States.110 In contrast with the words used by Congress, the dissent
viewed the majority as impermissibly reading the term “last” into the statute to qualify “entry.”111
But according to the dissent, the Court had already rejected the argument that Congress had a
particular entry, of multiple entries, in mind; in Volpe, for instance, the Court had rejected the
argument that it was only the initial entry that mattered for purposes of assessing application of
the deportability provisions, not a subsequent entry.112 Bonetti made “the converse argument that
the word ‘entering’ should be modified to read ‘last entering.’ I would not so amend the statute in
disregard of the long and uniform judicial, legislative, and administrative history where ‘entry’ has
acquired a definitive, technical gloss, to wit, its ordinary meaning and nothing more or less.”113
The rule’s invocation between 1950 and 1958 established some level of staying-power for
the principle; Delgadillo and Fong Haw Tan were not to be solitary precedents in this regard.114
Yet many of the same flaws that make the earlier cases weak precedents are equally present in the
later cases. Again, the rule was not relevant to the disposition of any case between 1950 and 1958;
in Eichenlaub, the Court resolved the case against the alien based on the plain language of the
statute, and in Barber the Court based its holding on the specialized meaning of “entry.” Bonetti
is ostensibly a closer call, but the better interpretation of the statute is that arrived at by the
majority; Bonetti was admitted to the United States in 1938, and it was the status gained at that
time that the government sought to annul through deportation. It is true that he had been admitted
earlier, but that status was surrendered upon departure in 1937, and given that there was no
compelling argument as to why the prior entry should then be the touchstone for deportability in
the 1950s. None of these decisions come out differently in a world where the immigration rule of
lenity does not exist.
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These cases also highlight the subjective grounds for the rule’s invocation. Applying the
rule is contingent on finding ambiguity in statutory language, and clarity (or lack thereof) is not
necessarily an objective trait but in the eye of the beholder. Justice Frankfurter dissented in
Eichenlaub and advocated for what would have been the most robust application of lenity in any
of these initial five cases, but joined a dissent in Bonetti finding that the plain language foreclosed
the alien’s interpretation of the statute. Justice Burton wrote the decision in Eichenlaub deciding
the case on plain language grounds, but joined the majority in Bonetti which invoked (in some
fashion) the rule of lenity. Justice Clark penned the dissent in Bonetti, finding recourse to lenity
unnecessary given the plain language of the statute, while joining the majority in Barber, which
invoked the rule. The competing circumstances in which any one Justice may be inclined to invoke
lenity simply reinforce the obvious: different judges may have different views of what the plain
language requires. But that fact also points away from lenity filling an important role. The
Supreme Court is able to resolve these cases on de novo review of the statutory language, and
differences of opinion may be accommodated within the broad ambit of “traditional statutory
interpretation.” There is simply not a level of serious ambiguity in these cases that would trigger
a need to resort to a tie-breaking rule of absolute last resort.
II. THE IMMIGRATION RULE OF LENITY IN THE SUPREME COURT, 1964—PRESENT
This Part picks up with the first cases utilizing the rule in conjunction with the Immigration
and Nationality Act and carries the story forward into the present. The temporal scope of this Part
is, however, bifurcated by a different development—the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in
Chevron. The decision in that case, and the extension of administrative deference to immigration
cases, essentially renders the immigration rule of lenity irrelevant as a legal matter. Subsection A
considers the two cases raising the rule decided in the 1960s and comes to a familiar conclusion:
the rule had little or no effect on the decision rendered. Subsection B presents Chevron and its
subsequent extension to immigration proceedings, while Subsection C considers how the rule has
been raised and considered in immigration cases post-Chevron. Although not a numerous data set,
the rule’s reference in the Court’s post-Chevron cases fits the prevailing pattern. The rule is raised
as an afterthought or rhetorical device to clinch an interpretation otherwise rendered through
consideration of traditional tools of statutory construction. Beyond that point, there is also no
support in these cases for the proposition that lenity would trump deference. To the contrary, the
Court has assumed that where there is genuine ambiguity in a statutory provision, i.e., Congress
has provided a gap to be filed, it is the agency’s prerogative to fill that gap in any reasonable and
permissible manner.
A. Pre-Chevron Applications: Costello and Errico
The rule was “applied” twice more in the 1960s before lying dormant for the better part of
two decades, at least as an explicit principle relied upon by the Court.115 In 1964, the Court
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revisited the question of whether an alien who is denaturalized could then be deported based on
criminal convictions entered while he was a citizen.116 With the advent of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, the prior crime-involving-moral-turpitude provision had been revised.
Under the 1952 Act, “[a]ny alien in the United States … shall upon the order of the Attorney
General, be deported who—… (4) is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed
within five years after entry and either sentenced to confinement or confined therefor in a prison
or corrective institution, for a year or more, or who at any time after entry is convicted of two
crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct,
regardless of whether confined therefor and regardless of whether the convictions were in a single
trial.”117 The Court determined that Eichenlaub was not controlling, given both differences in the
relevant statutory language and the expressed intent of Congress.118 Although both language and
history supported the decision in Eichenlaub, “[n]either the language nor the history of § 241(a)(4)
lends itself so easily to a similar construction.”119 On some level, there were at least two plausible
interpretations of the statutory language: “[t]he petitioner’s construction—that the language
permits deportation only of a person who was an alien at the time of his conviction, and the Court
of Appeals’ construction—that the language permits deportation of a person now an alien who at
any time after entry has been convicted of two crimes, regardless of his status at the time of his
convictions—are both possible readings of the statute[.]”120
With neither language nor history proving definitive, the Court looked to statutory structure
and context. “Although no legislative history illumines our problem, considerable light is
forthcoming from another provision of the statute itself.”121 Section 241(b)(2) provided that “if
the court sentencing such alien for such crime shall make, at the time of first imposing judgment
or passing sentence, or within thirty days thereafter, a recommendation … that such alien not be
deported,” the deportation would not take place.122 The Supreme Court found that this provision
would be inoperable for aliens who were convicted of crimes when naturalized citizens: “A
naturalized citizen would not ‘at the time of first imposing judgment or passing sentence,’ or
presumably ‘within thirty days thereafter,’ be an ‘alien’ who could seek to invoke the protection
of this section of law.”123 This factor tipped the scales for the majority, which was hesitant to
adopt a construction of Section 241(a)(4) that “would, with respect to an entire class of aliens,
completely nullify a procedure so intrinsic a part of the legislative scheme.”124
Having resolved the case on its own interpretation of the statute, with special emphasis on
structure and context, the majority proceeded to pay homage to the immigration rule of lenity.
Even if resort to structure in the form of Section 241(b)(2) was not determinative, the Court would
“nonetheless be constrained by accepted principles of statutory construction in this area of the law
ironically, had presented argument for the government in Errico, contending that the waiver provision should be
interpreted narrowly.
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to resolve that doubt in favor of the petitioner.”125 Concluding that convictions entered against an
alien while he was a citizen could count for purposes of deportability “might find support in logic.
But since the stakes are considerable for the individual, we will not assume that Congress meant
to trench on his freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several possible
meanings of the words used.”126
The dissent, in contrast, would have found the statutory language sufficient to resolve the
case against the alien, buttressed by relevant legislative intent and the reasonableness of seeking
deportation of criminal aliens regardless of when the conviction was entered—during the period
of naturalization or after denaturalization. In Justice White’s words, “I have no quarrel with the
doctrine that where the Court is unable to discern the intent of Congress, ambiguities should be
resolved in favor of the deportee, but here there is a clear expression of congressional purpose. I
would carry it out.”127
In 1966, the Court had to confront an opaquely worded provision pertaining to relief from
deportation.128 The INA provided that “[t]he provisions … relating to the deportation of aliens
within the United States on the ground that they were excludable at the time of entry as aliens who
have sought to procure, or have procured visas or other documentation, or entry into the United
States by fraud or misrepresentation shall not apply to an alien otherwise admissible at the time of
entry who is the spouse, parent, or a child of a United States citizen[] or of an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence.”129 The dispute in INS v. Errico centered on the “otherwise
admissible” language: did that section apply to an alien with the necessary familial relationship,
who entered or was admitted based on fraud or misrepresentation, but was inadmissible at the time
of entry because of national-origin quota restrictions in place prior to the 1965 Act?130 The
government, with then-Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall presenting argument before the
Court, contended that “to be otherwise admissible at the time of entry the alien must show that he
would have been admitted even if he had not lied, and that the aliens in these cases would not have
been admitted because of the quota restrictions.”131 On the other side of the argument, the alien
contended that the government’s construction was too narrow, since any material fraud or
misrepresentation in connection with entry likely covered up by a fact that made the alien
inadmissible; in other words, were the alien otherwise admissible within the meaning of the
government’s argument there would not be any reason to engage in conduct that would implicate
a need for the waiver.132
To resolve the question, the Court examined the history of provisions pertaining to
discretionary relief for fraud or misrepresentations connected to entry and admission. That history
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indicated that for aliens with qualifying family relationships, establishing that they were
“otherwise admissible” did not include establishing that they would have been admissible under
the quota restrictions, i.e., an alien would be entitled to relief for fraud connected with evading the
quota restrictions, so long as the alien possessed a qualifying family relationship.133 The intent of
the earlier provisions “not to require that aliens who are close relatives of United States citizens
have complied with quota restrictions to escape deportation for their fraud is clear from its
language, and there is nothing in the legislative history to suggest that Congress had in mind a
contrary result” under either the earlier Acts or when essentially restating those provisions in
enacting Section 241(f). The Court found this interpretation “further reinforced when the section
is regarded in the context of the 1957 Act. The fundamental purpose of this legislation was to
unite families,” and that purpose was best served by adopting the broader interpretation of the
provision’s scope.134 Having again resolved the question presented on more or less traditional
grounds, the Court proceeded to application of the immigration rule of lenity colored by the
humanitarian concerns already noted: “We conclude that to give meaning to the statute in the light
of its humanitarian purpose of preventing the breaking up of families composed in part at least of
American citizens, the conflict between the circuits must be resolved in favor of the aliens.”135 In
other words, “[e]ven if there was some doubt as to the correct construction of the statute, the doubt
should be resolved in favor of the alien.”136
Nothing distinguishes the application of the rule in these cases from the similarly rhetorical
recitations of that rule in the cases between 1947 and 1958. The rule itself is largely an after
thought trotted out only to buttress application of traditional tools of statutory construction. In
Costello, the statutory structure was determinative; the inclusion of Section 241(b)(2) provided
support for the contention that to be a deportable offense, the offense had to be committed when
the individual was an alien. Otherwise, a major procedural protection put into place by the 1952
Act would have been rendered a dead letter for those convicted of offenses while a citizen.
Likewise, in Errico, the history and statutory language was determinative; history illuminated the
meaning of “otherwise admissible” in the relief context, and established the irrelevance of the
quota restrictions for judging the “admissibility” of aliens for purposes of the waiver.137
Legislative intent, too, was important, and in Errico supported a liberal construction of the
statutory scheme. Lenity fits comfortably with the Court’s approach in Errico, but that is less
because of application of the rule itself than the fact that here, unlike the earlier cases, the Court
was actually addressing a statutory provision intended to provide a humanitarian benefit to aliens.
B. Chevron Deference and Immigration Law
The concept of judicial deference to the determinations of administrative agencies within
their areas of competence predates 1984. In 1904, for instance, and with citation to cases as early
as 1840, the Supreme Court held that “where Congress has committed to the head of a department
133
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certain duties requiring the exercise of judgment and discretion, his action thereon, whether it
involve questions of law or fact, will not be reviewed by the courts unless he has exceeded his
authority or this court should be of opinion that his action was clearly wrong.”138 In 1961, the
Court opined that “[t]his admonition has been consistently followed by this Court whenever
decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved reconciling conflicting policies, and
a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the given situation depended upon more
than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations.”139 Where the
agency’s choice “represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were
committed to the agency’s care by statute, [the courts] should not disturb it unless it appears from
the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have
sanctioned.”140
The Supreme Court’s decision in 1984 in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., molded this historical practice and gave form to the decisional framework
that should govern a court’s review of agency action.141 Under the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977,142 states that had not achieved specified national air qualify standards were required to
“establish a permit program regulating ‘new or modified major stationary sources’ of air
pollution.”143 The Environmental Protection Agency in turn promulgated a regulation that allowed
“nonattainment” states “to adopt a plantwide definition of the term ‘stationary source.’”144 Under
that definition, “an existing plant that contains several pollution-emitting devices may install or
modify one piece of equipment without meeting the permit conditions if the alteration will not
increase the total emissions from the plant.”145 The United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit set aside the regulations, holding that the “bubble-based” definition of
stationary source was “inappropriate” given the ends of the 1977 Amendments—to improve air
quality.146
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “[t]he basic legal error of the Court of Appeals
was to adopt a static judicial definition of the term ‘stationary source’ when it had decided that
Congress itself had not commanded that definition.”147 In so holding, the Court laid out what
would become known as the Chevron-framework, the two-step process for determining the
permissibility of an agency interpretation of a statute it is charged with administering. At the first
step “is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”148 The second step follows if “the
court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue[.]” 149 In such
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circumstances, “the court does not simply impose its own construction of the statute, as would be
necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”150 The Court rooted this iteration of
the rule in the reality of the modern administrative state: “[t]he power of an administrative agency
to administer a congressionally created … program necessarily requires the formulation of policy
and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.” 151 Delegations
may be express, in which case the agency’s rule or decision must be “given controlling weight
unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”152 Or they may be implied,
in which case “a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”153 In Chevron itself, the
Supreme Court concluded that the Clear Air Act Amendments did not foreclose the regulation
adopted by the EPA, and that “its definition of the term ‘source’ [was] a permissible construction
of the statute which seeks to accommodate progress in reducing air pollution with economic
growth.”154
Chevron has special relevance in the immigration context, where Executive Branch
authority and discretion have long been recognized not only as integral components of the statutory
scheme, but as background principles implicated because of the very nature of immigration law.
Deference to the political branches is rooted in the plenary power, succinctly summarized by
Justice Frankfurter in 1952: “[t]he conditions of entry for every alien, the particular classes of
aliens that shall be denied entry altogether, the basis for determining such classification, the right
to terminate hospitality to aliens, the grounds of which such determinations shall be based, have
been recognized as matters solely for the responsibility of the Congress and wholly outside the
power of this Court to control.”155 Thus, even before Chevron, the Supreme Court had noted that
“it is important to underscore the limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation.
This Court has repeatedly emphasized that over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of
Congress more complete than it is over the admission of aliens. Our cases have long recognized
the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the
Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.”156 In other words, “the
power over aliens is of a political character and therefore subject only to narrow judicial review.”157
As a statutory matter, the Immigration and Nationality Act provides that “the determination
and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all questions of law shall be controlling.”158
The statute is otherwise replete with express delegations of decisional authority to the Attorney
General, many of which decisions are in his or her sole discretion.159 The applicability of Chevron
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to immigration decisions has thus been accepted by the Supreme Court since the very first cases
arose presenting the question.160
“It is [thus] clear that principles of Chevron deference are applicable to this statutory
scheme.”161 If anything, the typical deference extended to agencies under Chevron was
characterized as “heightened” in the arena of immigration law. The Supreme Court has
“recognized that judicial deference to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the
immigration context where officials ‘exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate
questions of foreign relations.’” 162 In Aguirre-Aguirre, for instance, the Supreme Court rejected
a Ninth Circuit decision that had been inadequately deferential to the agency’s determination of
what constituted a “serious non-political crime” for purposes of denying a claim to withholding of
removal. But as the Court noted, “[a] decision by the Attorney General to deem certain violent
offenses committed in another country as political in nature and to allow the perpetrators to remain
in the United States, may affect our relations with that country or its neighbors. The judiciary is
not well positioned to shoulder primary responsibility for assessing the likelihood and importance
of such diplomatic repercussions.”163
C. Post-Chevron Applications: An Outmoded Rule
Whatever role the rule could be said to have played in the Supreme Court’s pre-Chevron
cases, it has not been, fairly construed, even a rule of last resort in post-Chevron cases. The Court
has resolved many cases on its own reading of the text using traditional tools of statutory
construction (but not the rule of lenity), as this section establishes, while the Court has otherwise
deferred to reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions, as a subsequent section
shows.164
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The two main post-Chevron cases are INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca165 and INS v. St. Cyr.166 In
Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court had to resolve which standard governs whether an applicant has
established eligibility for asylum under the INA. The INA establishes two forms of relief and
protection for aliens who fear persecution in their country of nationality. First, withholding of
deportation (now called withholding of removal) was a mandatory form of protection triggered
where the alien establishes that his “life or freedom would be threatened” in the country of removal
based on a statutorily protected ground, i.e., race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.167 Second, asylum is a discretionary form of relief available to
applicants who can establish past “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account
of” a statutorily protected ground.168 In an earlier case, the Supreme Court had already held that
to establish eligibility for withholding of deportation, the alien had to demonstrate that “it is more
likely than not that [he] would be subject to persecution” in the country of removal.169 In reaching
that holding, the Court had rejected the applicant’s contention that the “would be threatened”
language of the withholding provision should be governed by the looser “well-founded fear”
standard that had developed under various statutory iterations pertaining to refugee admissions.170
Cardoza-Fonseca presented the converse argument—should the “more likely than not”
standard developed for withholding cases govern the “well-founded fear” inquiry? The
government argued, in essence, “that the only way an applicant can demonstrate a ‘well-founded
fear of persecution’ is to prove a ‘clear probability of persecution.’”171 The Court rejected this
argument for two main reasons. First, as a textual matter, “the language Congress used to describe
the two standards conveys very different meanings.”172 The “would be threatened” language in
the withholding provision pointed to an objective inquiry, whereas the asylum statute contemplated
some level of inquiry into the subjective mental state of the alien by requiring that any fear be
“well-founded.”173 And in common understanding, a fear could be “well-founded” even “when
there is less than a 50% chance of the occurrence taking place.”174 Second, “[t]he message
conveyed by the plain language of the Act is confirmed by an examination of its history.”175 Most
importantly, in this regard, was the intent of the drafters of the 1980 Refugee Act to bring United
States law into conformity with its international obligations under the 1952 Refugee Convention
and the 1967 Protocol.176 The consistent interpretation and application of the Convention’s own
definition of “refugee” indicated that an applicant may qualify where the evidence establishes
something significantly less than a “clear probability” of persecution.177 And differential treatment
of the two standards was especially warranted based on the structure of international law, which
was mirrored in the domestic Act: asylum corresponds to the discretionary relief contemplated by
the Convention, whereas withholding of deportation corresponds to the mandatory non165
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refoulement obligation, applicable where an applicant establishes a greater risk of harm if
removed.178
Resort to this traditional tools of statutory construction was sufficient to reject the
government’s argument that the two statutes should be interpreted to provide for identical
inquiries: “[o]ur analysis of the plain language of the Act, its symmetry with the United Nations
Protocol, and its legislative history, lead inexorably to the conclusion that to show a ‘well-founded
fear of persecution,’ an alien need not prove that it is more likely than not that he or she will be
persecuted in his or her home country.”179 These “ordinary canons of statutory construction” were
“compelling, even without regard to the longstanding principle of construing any lingering
ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien.”180
In contrast with the relatively easy disposition of Cardoza-Fonseca, INS v. St. Cyr
presented two thorny questions related to the massive statutory reforms enacted in 1996 by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act:181 whether habeas jurisdiction had been repealed, and whether the repeal of
relief available under former Section 212(c) was retroactive as applied to aliens who pled guilty to
a qualifying offense prior to enactment. On the procedural question of whether district courts
retained jurisdiction to consider questions of law in cases where the INA otherwise foreclosed
jurisdiction via a petition for review, the Supreme Court answered in the affirmative: “the absence
of [an alternative forum in which to raise the purported legal question], coupled with the lack of a
clear, unambiguous, and express statement of congressional intent to preclude judicial
consideration on habeas of such an important question of law, strongly counsels against adopting
a construction that would raise serious constitutional questions.”182
Having resolved the threshold jurisdictional issue, the Court proceed to the merits question:
whether the amendments to the relief provisions made in 1996 foreclosed an alien’s ability to seek
a certain form of discretionary relief from removal when the conviction was entered prior to the
effective date of IIRIRA. In 1996, St. Cyr had pled guilty to selling a controlled substance under
Connecticut state law, by which he became: 1) removable; and 2) eligible for a discretionary
waiver of deportation under former Section 212(c) of the INA.183 He was placed into removal
proceedings after the effective date of IIRIRA, and the agency declined to consider him for relief
under Section 212(c) based on the statutory repeal of that section.184 In analyzing the merits
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question, the Supreme Court began on solid and accepted ground: “A statute may not be applied
retroactively … absent a clear indication from Congress that it intended such a result.” 185 This
was a high-standard, and the “cases where this Court has found truly ‘retroactive’ effect adequately
authorized by statute have involved statutory language that was so clear that it could sustain only
one interpretation.”186 Although the government made various arguments relating to the language
of IIRIRA and its legislative history, the Court declined to find that this high standard was met.187
Rather, “[t]he presumption against retroactive application of ambiguous statutory provisions,
buttressed by ‘longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation
statutes in favor of the alien,’ forecloses the conclusion that … ‘Congress itself has affirmatively
considered the potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable
price to pay for the countervailing benefits.”188
On its face, St. Cyr seems to present a closer-call regarding the application of the
immigration rule of lenity. The Court explicitly references it as “buttressing” the other relevant
canon of construction, the presumption against retroactivity. But the rule even here is doing
nothing despite the rhetorical turn in the Court’s opinion, and its subsequent reference in another
retroactivity case five years later makes that point clear. At issue in Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales
was a different IIRIRA amendment, that to the INA’s reinstatement provision.189 That amendment
provided that “[i]f the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the United States illegally
after having been removed or having departed voluntarily, under an order of removal, the prior
order of removal is reinstated from its original date and is not subject to being reopened or
reviewed, the alien is not eligible and may not apply for any relief under this chapter, and the alien
shall be removed under the prior order at any time after the reentry.” 190 Fernandez-Vargas was
ordered removed sometime in the 1970s, but illegally reentered in 1982 and had remained in the
United States continuously since that date.191 He subsequently married a United States citizen and
sought to adjust his status, but this application triggered an investigation that uncovered the prior
order of removal, which the government then reinstated and used to remove him.192 On petition
for review, Fernandez-Vargas argued that pre-1996 law governed his claims, since he had illegally
reentered long before 1996, and that under that law, unlike IIRIRA’s reinstatement provision, he
remained eligible for adjustment of status.193 The Tenth Circuit rejected this claim, holding that
Section 241(a)(5) barred any further relief, and that its application to him “had no impermissibly
retroactive effect.”194
Before the Supreme Court, Fernandez-Vargas argued “that Congress intended that Section
241(a)(5) would not apply to illegal reentrants like him who returned to this country before the
provision’s effective date; and in any event, that application of the provision to such illegal
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reentrants would have an impermissibly retroactive effect, to be avoided by applying the
presumption against it.”195 The Supreme Court began by noting its three-step sequential analysis
for retroactivity cases. First, the question is “whether Congress has expressly prescribed the
statute’s proper reach, and in the absence of language as helpful as that we try to draw a comparably
firm conclusion about the temporal reach specifically intended by applying our normal rules of
construction.”196 Second, “[i]f that effort fails, we ask whether applying the statute to the person
objecting would have a retroactive consequence in the disfavored sense of ‘affecting substantive
rights, liabilities, or duties [on the basis] of conduct arising before [its] enactment.’”197 Finally, if
the answer to that second question is yes, the Court “then appl[ies] the presumption against
retroactivity by construing the statute as inapplicable to the event or act in question owing to the
absen[ce of] a clear indication from Congress that it intended such a result.”198
It was within this framework that Fernandez-Vargas sought to raise the immigration rule
of lenity. He contended that the rule should be applied at step-one of the retroactivity analysis:
“Since the new law is bereft of … clarity [regarding whether it applied to pre-enactment activity],”
Fernandez-Vargas argues that “we should apply the ‘longstanding principle of construing any
lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien[.]’”199 The effect of doing that,
however, would be to “impose ‘[t]he presumption against retroactive application of ambiguous
statutory provisions,’” limiting the scope of Section 241(a)(5)’s application to post-enactment
reentries only.200 Applying the immigration rule of lenity in this manner, at step-one of the
retroactivity analysis, would render unnecessary the remaining two steps.201 Yet as the Court
noted, “[i]t is not until a statute is shown to have no firm provision about temporal reach but to
produce a retroactive effect when straightforwardly applied that the presumption [against
retroactivity] has its work to do.”202
Declining to apply the rule in the manner advocated by Fernandez-Vargas, the Court
concluded that “[c]ommon principles of statutory interpretation fail to unsettle the apparent
application of § 241(a)(5) to any reentrant present in the country, whatever the date of return.”203
This aspect was ultimately more or less beside the point, however, as the Court held that, as applied
to Fernandez-Vargas, there was no retroactive effect. It was his “choice to continue his illegal
presence, after illegal reentry and after the effective date of the new law, that subjects him to the
new and less generous legal regime, not a past act that he is helpless to undo up to the moment the
Government finds him out.”204 The Court’s distillation of the retroactivity analysis in FernandezVargas does put the lie to any claim that the rule of lenity played a role in the Court’s earlier
decision in St. Cyr. The rule cannot come into play at the threshold to resolve any ambiguity in
whether Congress has clearly enough dictated the temporal application of a statute. But if the
Court gets to step-three, the presumption against retroactive application would itself take
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precedence and resolve the case in accord with how the immigration rule of lenity would have
resolved the case. In other words, it is not possible that the rule had a freestanding application in
St. Cyr; the statute remained “ambiguous” in a relevant sense after the first two steps of the
retroactivity analysis, but that ambiguity was resolved within the analysis itself by presuming only
prospective effect for the repeal of Section 212(c) relief.
The last significant invocation of the rule was in Kawashima v. Holder.205 The
Kawashimas, husband and wife, pled guilty respectively to violations of willfully making and
subscribing a false tax return,206 and aiding and assisting in the preparation of a false tax return.207
They were subsequently found removable as aliens convicted of an aggravated felony offense, as
defined by Section 1101(a)(43)(M): an offense that “(i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss
to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000; or (ii) is described in section 7201 of title 26 (relating to
tax evasion) in which revenue loss to the Government exceeds $10,000.”208 Before the Supreme
Court, the Kawashimas argued that Section 7206 offense do not involve “fraud or deceit,” and that
in any event all tax offenses are excluded by implication from subsection (i).209
The Supreme Court quickly rejected the first argument. “The language of Clause (i) is
clear. Anyone who is convicted of an offense that ‘involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to
the victim or victims exceeds $10,000’ has committed an aggravated felony and is subject to
deportation[.]”210 Convictions under Section 7206 met that definition, as the “elements of willfully
making and subscribing a false corporate tax return … and of aiding and assisting in the preparation
of a false tax return … establish that those crimes are deportable offenses because they necessarily
entail deceit.”211 The second argument was an argument by implication—that the express
reference to tax evasion in subsection (ii) was exhaustive of tax offenses, and that such offenses
were therefore outside the scope of subsection (i). The Court determined that there was nothing
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in the plain language of the statute to support the exclusion of tax offenses from the broad scope
of the language used by subsection (i)—an offense that “involves fraud or deceit[.]” And the
possibility that a court would conclude that tax evasion under 26 U.S.C. § 7201 would not qualify
as a “fraud or deceit” crime under subparagraph (i) was a sufficient justification for the disparate
treatment between that offense (given its own subsection) and other tax-based offenses (which
could fall under subsection (i)).212 The Kawashimas also argued “that subparagraph (M)’s
treatment of tax crimes other than tax evasion is ambiguous, and that we should therefore construe
the statute in their favor.”213 The Court rejected that invitation: “[w]e think the application of the
present statute clear enough that resort to the rule of lenity is not warranted.”214
This post-Chevron review of the rule’s application concludes in a familiar way, by noting
that there is no indication whatsoever in these opinions that the rule was relevant to decision. In
Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court explicitly noted it could and was resolving the case on other grounds
without the need to resort to the rule of strict construction. St. Cyr does raise the rule in a context
where it seems like it is relying on it at least in part, but the presumption against retroactive
application did the heavy lifting and left the rule of lenity with no work to do. Application of the
rule is rejected as unnecessary in both Fernandez-Vargas, which clarifies the inappropriateness of
applying the rule within the retroactivity analysis, and Kawashima.
There is also no support in these cases for an argument that lenity would displace Chevron
or even have a role to play within the Chevron framework. In Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court
construed the question of whether the withholding and asylum standards were identical as “a pure
question of statutory construction for the courts to decide.”215 It accepted the applicability of
deference to immigration decisions generally, but concluded that deference was not appropriate
since resolution of the case did not call for any of the gap-filling to which Chevron would apply.216
Chevron was also found to be irrelevant in St. Cyr. As the Court noted, “[b]ecause a statute that
is ambiguous with respect to retroactive application is construed under our precedent to be
unambiguously prospective, there is, for Chevron purposes, no ambiguity in such a statute for an
agency to resolve.”217 The rule was additionally noted in Dada v. Mukasey, but there the indication
is that Chevron would have work to do in cases of ambiguity and that the rule of lenity would not
serve as the tie-breaker; even as the Court adopted a de novo interpretation of the motion to reopen
and voluntary departure provisions as requiring a mechanism to permit withdrawal of the
voluntary departure request, it opined that the agency would have authority to render a different
interpretation and disagree with how the Court had resolved the case.218
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III. CONTEXTUALIZING THE ROLE OF LENITY IN IMMIGRATION CASES
This section moves from doctrinal overview to normative questions: how or why would
lenity have a role to play in interpreting the Immigration and Nationality Act in circumstances
where the application of administrative deference is otherwise required? Subsection A begins by
shifting focus to the rule of lenity in criminal cases. How and why that rule has been applied, and
its inherent limitations, are relevant to assessing whether a similar rule could play the same role in
the context of immigration cases. Subsection B returns to the immigration rule of lenity and the
fundamental question: even assuming some historical relevance for the rule, does it retain vitality
in a world governed by Chevron? The answer is no—its application is foreclosed by the nature of
the step-one inquiry and incompatible with the step-two inquiry, while it is unclear that there
remains space outside the Chevron framework where the rule could find a home. The final two
subsections address remaining questions. Subsection C confronts the question of whether lenity
should displace deference in a certain class of immigration cases, provisions directly concerned
with deportation, while allowing deference to apply to the remaining class of cases, e.g.,
interpretation of relief provisions. This typological distinction makes little sense, however,
because of the interconnected nature of the immigration laws. It also makes little sense under
Chevron’s framework, as the removability provisions are as much a matter of agency expertise as
any other facet of the immigration laws. The better rule is that which concludes Subsection B:
Chevron governs review in immigration cases to the exclusion of lenity. Finally, Subsection D
argues that the death of lenity will be of little moment, and considering its general and uniform
irrelevance to the decisions in which it has thus far been raised, it would seem difficult to seriously
contest that position. The Chevron framework ensures that aliens will not be subject to arbitrary
or capricious interpretations of the immigration laws, as such cases will be resolved either under
the clear intent of Congress or a reasonable and permissible construction of the statutory language
by the agency. And, in hindsight, this framework would have largely rendered the development
of the rule of lenity unnecessary. In other words, if lenity has done work in the past, it can safely
cede that role to Chevron now.
A. Strict Construction in Criminal Cases
The rule of strict construction of penal statutes, or the criminal rule of lenity, is “[t]he
judicial doctrine holding that a court, in construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out
multiple or inconsistent punishments, should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient
punishment.”219 The rule originated “in the legislative blood lust of eighteenth-century England.
Faced with a vast and irrational proliferation of capital offenses, judges invented strict construction
to stem the march to the gallows.”220 Writing in 1883, Sir Peter Maxwell wrote that “[t]he rule
which requires that penal and some other statutes shall be construed strictly was more rigorously
applied in former times, when the number of capital offences was one hundred and sixty or more;
when it was still punishable with death to cut down a cherry-tree in an orchard, or to be seen for a
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month in the company of gipsies [sic].”221 The rule survived the retrenchment of capital
punishment and was absorbed as a general rule of statutory construction to be applied in specific
circumstances. As early as 1820, Chief Justice Marshall paid homage to the rule, writing that
“[t]he rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old than
construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of the individuals; and
on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial
department. It is the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its
punishment.”222
But criticism of the rule is nearly as old as the rule itself, and many states acted to
implement legislation that would disallow strict construction of their penal codes. 223 In more
contemporary times, the rule has seemingly fallen out of favor as a dispositive rule of decision.224
Talk of the rule’s prior glory color the contemporary debate, but assertions of its historical
robustness seem misplaced or at least based on spotty evidence. 225 For instance, although Chief
Justice Marshall described the long-standing nature of the rule, his description of its application is
not one of particular strength or vitality: “It is said that notwithstanding [the rule of strict
construction], the intention of the law maker must govern in the construction of penal, as well as
other statutes. This is true. But this is not a new independent rule which subverts the old. It is a
modification of the ancient maxim, and amounts to this, that though penal laws are to be construed
strictly, they are not to be construed as strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature.
The maxim is not to be so applied as to narrow the words of the statute to the exclusion of cases
which those words, in their ordinary acceptation, or in the sense in which the legislature has
obviously used them, would comprehend. The intention of the legislature is to be collected from
the words they employ. Where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for
construction.”226 And for every example of the court “find[ing] ambiguity and adopt[ing] a narrow
construction even when it seemed illogical[], contrary to the literal language of the statute[], or
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likely to frustrate the congressional purpose,”227 there are multiple examples of the Court noting
the inherent limitations of the rule and declining to adopt a narrower construction of the statute
even where that narrower construction could be deemed plausible.228
The rule has never, then, been absolute or applied in a vacuum; “whenever it is invoked it
comes attended with qualifications and other rules no less important.”229 As the Court opined in
Hartwell, the “rule of strict construction is not violated by permitting the words of the statute to
have their full 230meaning, or the more extended of two meanings, as the wider popular instead of
the more narrow technical one; but the words should be taken in such a sense, bent neither one
way nor the other, as will best manifest the legislative intent.” The overarching focus of the courts
in applying the rule of lenity, in both the past and modern times, has thus been the intent of the
legislature.231 Nonetheless, as the focus on that intent has grown in contemporary times, the
227
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importance of the rule has receded: the rule “has lost much of its force and importance in recent
times, since it has become more and more generally recognized that the paramount duty of the
judicial interpreter is to put upon the language of the Legislature, honestly and faithfully, its plain
and rational meaning, and to promote its object.”232
Under modern iterations of the rule, it “only applies if, after considering text, structure,
history, and purpose, there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute, such that the
Court must simply guess as to what Congress intended.”233 It is not sufficient to find the statute
less than clear or that a narrower construction is possible.234 Before the Court will consider resort
to lenity, it must bring all traditional interpretive tools to bear on the relevant statutory phrase in
order to try and ascertain its meaning.235 The rule of lenity “comes into operation at the end of the
process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding
consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers.”236 And, as a tool ultimately tied to legislative intent,
the rule is not “a directive to this Court to invent distinctions neither reflective of the policy behind
congressional enactments nor intimated by the words used to implement the legislative goal.”237
Deference-related issues are not generally present in the interpretation of pure criminal
statutes. “A court owes no deference to the prosecution’s interpretation of a criminal law,” since
“[c]riminal statutes ‘are for the courts, not for the Government, to construe.’”238 To the extent the
question has arisen, it has done so in the context of an “executive agency’s interpretation of a law
that contemplates both criminal and administrative enforcement[.]”239 Whether arising under the
securities, environmental, or labor law statutes, to name a few, the courts of appeals have uniformly
determined that deference is warranted in such circumstances, and thus that the criminal rule of
lenity’s role is further cabined; ambiguity in such circumstances may be resolved by a permissible
agency interpretation, leaving lenity with little or no role to play in such cases.240
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The Supreme Court has not definitively resolved the question; it has not foreclosed resort
to deference prior to lenity, nor endorsed lenity to the exclusion of deference. But its decisions
seem to indicate some role still for deference to play even in the context of the so-called “dual-use
statutes.”241 Confronting the EPA’s regulatory definition of the term “take” under the Endangered
Species Act, for instance, the Court noted that “[t]he latitude the ESA gives the Secretary in
enforcing the statute, together with the degree of regulatory expertise necessary to its enforcement,
establishes that we own some degree of deference to the Secretary’s reasonable interpretation.”242
In reaching its decision, the Court rejected resort to lenity simply because the ESA also provided
for criminal penalties: “We have never suggested that the rule of lenity should provide the standard
for reviewing facial challenges to administrative regulations whenever the governing statute
authorizes criminal enforcement.”243 The opinion in Babbitt may be weak support for a more
general rule as to how lenity interacts with deference. The decision “expressly limits itself to
‘facial challenges,’ the sorts of claims that raise arguments—say that the regulation exceeded the
agency’s authority and thus was not enforceable in all its applications—that have no connection
to the rule of lenity.”244 And Justice Scalia previously described this language as a “drive-by ruling
… deserv[ing] of little weight.”245 But the general principle is borne out in other cases. In United
States v. O’Hagan, for instance, the Court applied deference canons to a legislative rule
implemented by the Securities and Exchange Commission and concluded that the Commission’s
assessment of that rule, and whether it “is reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent acts,” must
be accorded “‘controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute.’”246 And the Court subsequently applied Skidmore deference to the Secretary of Labor’s
“views about the meaning of [] enforcement language” within the agency’s expertise,247 rejecting
resort to the rule of lenity after resolving the case on deference grounds. In fact, the Court’s
statement that “after engaging in traditional methods of statutory interpretation, we cannot find
that the statute remains sufficiently ambiguous to warrant application of the rule of lenity here,”248
supports the argument that Chevron is such a tool to be applied prior to resort to lenity.
B. How or Why Would Lenity Fit Within the Deference Framework?
The historical overview of both the immigration rule of lenity and its much older relative,
the criminal rule of lenity, is important to understanding how or why lenity should fit within the
deference framework announced by the Supreme Court in Chevron. This subsection turns to that
focal question, and proceeds in three parts. First, is lenity relevant at the first step of Chevron?
Second, if not, does it come into play at step-two? And finally, if the answer is again no, does
241
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there nonetheless exist a class of cases outside the scope of Chevron to which the rule of lenity
may have relevance? The answer to the first two questions is a resounding “no.” The answer to
the third is similarly a “no,” with a potentially narrow qualification.
1. Step-One?
The purpose of Chevron’s step-one is to ascertain whether Congress has clearly spoken on
the precise question at issue, and it if has, that is the end of the matter: that plain meaning must
control.249 Lenity, on the other hand, operates in a world where there is some doubt or ambiguity
regarding the statutory language and legislative intent. It makes no sense to reference lenity in the
context of trying to find the plain meaning of a statutory provision, and the function of applying
lenity at step-one would more often than not frustrate the intent behind that inquiry. As David
Rubenstein has argued, “one cannot fairly say that the rule of lenity sheds light on Congress’s
actual intent as to any ‘precise question.’ Instead, lenity is a transmutable concept that affords the
most favorable interpretation to the alien in any given case, whatever that may be.”250
The immigration rule of lenity’s poor fit at step-one of the Chevron framework tracks the
similar irrelevance of the criminal rule of lenity at the threshold of interpreting penal statutes. The
inquiry then is whether, taking the language together with traditional tools of statutory
construction, and giving the words their fair meaning, a more or less plain meaning can be
distilled.251 If application of those tools of construction distill such a meaning, that interpretation
controls even if it is harsh and even if a more lenient construction of the statute could be
contemplated.252 In other words, the criminal rule does not operate at the threshold as a directive
to adopt the most lenient interpretation possible, and the legislative intent always must be the
guide.253 Where that intent can be gleaned, either from the language of the statute itself or from
other relevant sources, the inquiry is at an end.
This view of the immigration rule as not operating at step-one to mitigate the otherwise
harsh consequences, or limited scope of relief, contemplated by Congress in enacting a provision,
finds additional support in Supreme Court precedent, as Rubenstein explains.254 In INS v.
Phinpathya, the Ninth Circuit held that an alien could establish eligibility for suspension of
deportation, which required seven years “continuous physical presence” in the United States,
despite her three month absence from the country during the relevant statutory period.255 The court
of appeals concluded that this departure was not “meaningfully interruptive” of her presence, since
she always intended to return, and thus could not serve to foreclose eligibility for relief.256 The
Supreme Court reversed, finding the term “continuous” plain and the Ninth Circuit’s contrary
reading foreclosed by this plain meaning.257 In reaching this holding, the Court rejected the alien’s
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argument that, despite the plain language, the statute should be construed more generously in line
“with the equitable and ameliorative nature of the suspension remedy.”258 The Court concluded
that a liberal interpretation would conflict with the result Congress itself intended in enacting the
statute,259 and that if Congress wanted a less harsh relief provision, it was “up to [it] to temper the
laws rigidity if it so desires.”260 Until that time, the plain meaning of the existing statute controlled,
and that plain meaning foreclosed the alien’s argument.261 In another case involving suspension
of deportation, which in addition to physical presence required a qualifying family relationship
with a United States citizen spouse, parent, or child, the Third Circuit had reversed an agency
decision and remanded for it to consider whether the alien’s relationship with his United States
citizen nieces was the functional equivalent of the parent-child relationship.262 The Supreme Court
found the Third Circuit’s attempt to inject a more liberal operation into the statutory scheme
inappropriate: “even if Hector’s relationship with his nieces closely resembles a parent-child
relationship, we are constrained to hold that Congress, through the plain language of the statute,
precluded this functional approach to defining the term ‘child.’”263
The immigration rule of lenity is not front and center in these cases, but lurks behind the
façade of what the Court is actually doing. As Rubenstein writes, “[w]hile the Supreme Court in
Phinpathya and Hector did not expressly refer to the immigration rule of lenity, the Court did
reject any notion that lenity has a role in statutory interpretation where the terms of the statute are
clear.”264
Beyond the incoherence of applying a rule tied to ambiguity at the level of trying to
ascertain the plain meaning of a statute, there are both jurisprudential and structural concerns that
would also argue against its use at this stage. First, lenity could be applied at step-one only if it
had attained a sufficient status to be classed with the “clear statement rules” that the Supreme Court
has applied at step-one.265 But the immigration rule of lenity does not have such an exalted
pedigree; it is a recently introduced rule of construction that is at best a tie-breaker in narrow
circumstances, not a rule “deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embod[ying] a legal doctrine
centuries older than our Republic.”266 Moreover, the Supreme Court itself has not treated the rule
as in a class with the other “clear statement” canons. It relied on traditional canons in CardozaFonseca while noting that resort to those canons was sufficient without reference to lenity,
indicating that lenity did not occupy comparable ground in the interpretive analysis.267 Likewise,
Fernandez-Vargas rejected resort to lenity as incapable with the structure the Court had already
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established to assess retroactivity and impermissible retroactive effect. 268 And in any event, the
rule of lenity would be an ill-fit with the other clear statement rules, which tend to serve the
purpose, at least ostensibly, of elucidating congressional intent or at least the legal backdrop
against which Congress is assumed to be legislating.269 The immigration rule of lenity does no
such thing; it is irrelevant to ascertaining the intent of Congress, and serves only to resolve
ambiguity once that intent cannot be found from the language itself and other accepted tools of
statutory construction.
Second, applying lenity at step-one would entail unacceptable structural consequences for
the deference framework. If lenity applied at step-one to resolve the meaning of the statute, there
would never be a reason to proceed to step-two in an immigration case. Rather, once any
ambiguity was found, the rule would immediately apply to resolve that ambiguity in favor of the
alien, leaving no room or reason for the Court to then assess the reasonableness or permissibility
of the agency’s own interpretation. Applied at step-one, the immigration rule of lenity would
eviscerate the Chevron framework for all immigration cases.
2. Step-Two?
Step-two of Chevron, concerned as it is with resolving ambiguity, provides on first blush
a more comfortable fit for the immigration rule of lenity. Is it possible that lenity is applicable at
step-two, and if so, how is it to be applied? Reviewing the case law and literature, Rubenstein
posited at least two ways in which lenity could be applied at step-two: as a rule that the agency
would be required to apply itself in interpreting ambiguous statutory provisions, or, on petition for
review before the courts of appeals, as a “litmus test for reasonableness.”270 There are, however,
at least two problems with applying the rule in this fashion. Neither application fits with the
statement of deference and limited review required at Chevron step-two, and neither fits actual
Supreme Court practice in immigration cases presenting step-two issues.
First, the Court has made clear in numerous cases that the question at step-two is not
whether the agency had adopted the interpretation a court deems “best” or the interpretation that
the court itself would prefer.271 Rather, the question is whether the interpretation adopted by the
agency is a permissible and reasonable construction of the statute in light of all relevant
considerations.272 Adopting lenity at step-two would eliminate the agency discretion inherent in
the delegations by Congress by dictating the interpretation that must follow once any ambiguity or
gap is found. This contradicts decades, if not centuries, of Supreme Court precedent that establish
that an agency is not required to select a specific interpretation against competing plausible
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interpretation of the statute; it must only select an interpretation that is reasonable.273 Using lenity
as a “litmus test” before the courts of appeals ostensibly provides more discretion, if the point is
that lenity will be a relevant factor when reviewing the agency determination but not alone
determinative of the reasonableness of that interpretation. But even in this context, it is not clear
why, if two interpretations are equally plausible, and equally permissible and reasonable, lenity
should place a thumb on the scale of one rather than the other. For the agency as well as the
reviewing courts, the question should be only whether the interpretation adopted is reasonable. If
it is, that ends the inquiry at step-two. There should not be a further inquiry into whether, even if
the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, a more lenient interpretation was possible and thus
possibly required. Whether as a consideration for the agency or the reviewing court, applying the
rule at step-two would eviscerate the Chevron framework in a similar way as its application at
step-one. There would never be any room for agency interpretation, as once ambiguity was found
any doubts regarding the proper construction would be resolved in favor of the more lenient
interpretation.
Second, application of lenity at step-two is at best in tension with Supreme Court practice,
and at worst contrary to that practice. The Supreme Court has consistently deferred to agency
interpretations of the INA at step-two without regard to whether a more lenient or permissive
interpretation of the statute was possible. In Aguirre-Aguirre, the Court reversed a Ninth Circuit
decision for failure to give appropriate deference to the agency’s construction of the serious
nonpolitical crime bar to withholding of deportation.274 According to the Supreme Court, the court
of appeals had, in concluding that the Board had to “supplement” its interpretation of the statute
“by examining additional factors,” “failed to accord the required level of deference to the
interpretation of the serious nonpolitical crime exception adopted by the Attorney General and
BIA.”275 In Holder v. Martinez-Gutierrez, the Supreme Court upheld the Board’s interpretation
of the cancellation of removal statute as not requiring that a parent’s continuous physical presence
be imputed to a minor child for purposes of establishing statutory eligibility for relief.276 In doing
so, it rejected a contrary Ninth Circuit decision that had concluded such imputation was required,
at least in part because of the “canon of construction that resolves ambiguities in favor of the
alien.”277 The Ninth Circuit opined that in rejecting the Board’s contrary interpretation and
“allowing imputation, we merely implement the countervailing and coequal congressional policy
of recognizing that presence in the United States of an extended length gives rise to such strong
ties to the United States that removal would result in undue hardship.”278 Contrary to the court of
appeals, however, the Supreme Court found the Board’s interpretation reasonable and permissible,
and thus the end of the matter for interpretive purposes.279 Finally, in Scialabba v. Cuellar de
Osorio, the Court upheld a strict agency interpretation of the retention and automatic conversion
provisions enacted into the family-based visa preference system in order to safeguard “child”
beneficiaries who turned 21 after the visa application was filed but before the visa became
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“available.”280 In so holding, the Court rejected the alien’s argument that “the BIA acted
unreasonably in choosing the more restrictive reading” of the statute.281 The plurality noted that
the Board’s interpretation was recommended by “administrative simplicity,” and that the agency
had “offered a cogent argument, reflecting statutory purposes, for distinguishing between agedout beneficiaries” in different preference categories.282 In the view of Justice Kagan, Cuellar de
Osorio was “the kind of case Chevron was built for. Whatever Congress might have meant … it
failed to speak clearly. Confronted with a self-contradictory, ambiguous provision in a complex
statutory scheme, the Board chose a textually reasonable construction consonant with its view of
the purposes and policies underlying immigration law.”283
Beyond merits cases, the rule is also inconsistent with Supreme Court practice in cases
where that Court has remanded to the Board for it to exercise its interpretive authority. For
instance, in Gonzales v. Thomas, the Court summarily reversed a Ninth Circuit decision and
remanded proceedings to the agency for it to consider in the first instance the alien’s late-raised
claim that her family constituted a particular social group for purposes of asylum eligibility.284
Subsequently, in Negusie v. Holder, the Court remanded for the agency to determine in the first
instance whether there is a coercion or voluntariness exception to application of the persecutor-bar
to asylum and withholding-of-removal eligibility.285 Both of these cases apply a version of the
“ordinary remand rule,” the principle that “[g]enerally speaking, a court of appeals should remand
a case to an agency for decision of a matter that statutes place primarily in agency hands.”286 In
Negusie, the Court explicitly supported its remand decision with reference to the deference
applicable to agency interpretations of statutes they are charged with administering: the “remand
rule exists, in part, because ambiguities in statutes within an agency’s jurisdiction to administer
are delegations of authority to the agency to fill the statutory gap in reasonable fashion. Filling
these gaps … involves difficult policy choices that agencies are better equipped to make than
courts.”287 If lenity applied at step-two, however, there would not be any meaningful reason to
remand. The appropriate interpretation, i.e., the most lenient, could and should be imposed and
applied by the Court in the first instance.
3. Relevance “outside” Chevron?
Lenity is not compatible with Chevron deference. But does that mean it has no place in
the interpretation of immigration law? Rubenstein thought not: “While the rule of lenity has no
place within Chevron’s two-step framework, a role for lenity exists beyond Chevron—after the
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court determinates that: (1) the statute is ambiguous; and (2) the agency’s interpretation is
unreasonable.”288 For Rubenstein, such a role is consistent with Chevron, since it comes into play
only if the agency’s interpretation is not reasonable or permissible, and with the concept of lenity
itself, which is meant to come into play “only as a doctrine of ‘last resort.’”289 Rubenstein’s choice
of case to illustrate his theory was, however, unfortunate—the Ninth Circuit’s decision in CuevasGaspar where the Supreme Court subsequently and unanimously reversed, holding that the
Board’s contrary interpretation was entitled to deference as a permissible construction of the
statute.290
This point aside, two others bear mentioning. First, it is not clear that lenity has a role to
play even if the court finds that the agency’s interpretation is unreasonable. If the statute is
ambiguous and there is no plain meaning to apply, the agency has the authority to interpret the
provision. If it has done so in an unreasonable manner, that error should be flagged for the agency
by the reviewing court and proceedings remanded so the agency can consider the issue anew
apprised of its prior error.291 In other words, the traditional “ordinary remand rule” discussed
above undercuts the notion that the immigration rule of lenity has work to do if the agency’s
interpretation is unreasonable. Rather than apply lenity, the case should return to the agency for it
to correct its errors and reach a permissible construction of the statute.
Second, even assuming lenity could fill this role, it is not clear that the court’s decision
would be anything but a place-holder interpretation that the agency would not be bound to adopt
itself. If the court of appeals applies lenity after concluding that the agency’s interpretation is not
reasonable, then it is applying its own construction to an ambiguous statutory phrase. The Supreme
Court has held, however, that “[a] court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency
construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its
construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency
discretion.”292 Thus, even were the court to adopt a more lenient construction in the circumstances
contemplated by Rubenstein, nothing binds the agency to that construction in a subsequent case.
Rather, it is free to render its own interpretation of the relevant provision subject to the normal
strictures of Chevron, that its interpretation be reasonable and permissible.
The “beyond Chevron” rubric contemplated by Rubenstein thus inevitably comes back to
Chevron. The court of appeals, concluding that the agency interpretation of an ambiguous
statutory provision is unreasonable should either remand for a new interpretation, or it can render
a decision applying lenity but subject to agency “reversal” under Brand X. In either case, the
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question on further will again boil down to the permissibility of the new interpretation under
Chevron.
Although Rubenstein’s specific conception may not work, there could be a narrower
beyond-Chevron space where lenity might yet come into play. Under the criminal rule of lenity,
the rule is triggered only in cases of “grievous ambiguity” where even after considering all relevant
tools of statutory construction the court is left only to “guess” at what Congress may have
intended.293 Perhaps lenity may be relevant in such cases where ambiguity admits of no truly
reasonable harmonization upon consideration of all relevant canons of construction and policy
options. As Chief Justice Roberts noted in his concurrence in Cuellar de Osorio, “[d]irect conflict
is not ambiguity, and the resolution of such a conflict is not statutory construction but legislative
choice. Chevron is not a license for an agency to repair a statute that does not make sense.”294
This would be a small selection of cases, attributable to near-absolute incoherent draftsmanship on
the part of Congress. And it would also be subjective as to what qualified as a sufficiently direct
conflict to move the case outside the scope of Chevron. Returning to Cuellar de Osorio, Justice
Kagan’s opinion for the plurality deferred to a statute it described as “Janus-faced,” each of the
relevant provision’s two clauses pointing in a separate direction.295 “Read either most naturally,
and the other appears to mean not what it says. That internal tension makes possible alternative
reasonable constructions, bringing into correspondence in one way or another the section’s
different parts.”296 In the plurality’s view, “when that is so, Chevron dictates that a court defer to
the agency’s choice—here, to the Board’s expert judgment about which interpretation fits best
with, and makes most sense of, the statutory scheme.”297
Nonetheless, leaving aside the question of what level of conflict pushes a case outside the
purview of Chevron, it is possible to conceive the immigration rule of lenity as having some role
to play in deciding that class of case. But in such circumstances, there is no conflict with deference
principles anyway. Sufficiently grievous conflict to trigger the rule of lenity presupposes a case
where a reasonable interpretation of the statute is not possible, and so no displacement of agency
discretion is occasioned by applying lenity. Even without a conflict between lenity and deference,
a court would be free to adopt an interpretation it thought most fair to the language used and the
intent evinced by Congress, without necessarily adopting the narrowest construction of the
statute.298 And it bears mentioning that if the statutory provision in Cuellar de Osorio did not
present such a case, even as it engendered four separate opinions each resolving the case on
different grounds, it seems unlikely that there would be many, if any, circumstances where the rule
of lenity would be used for resolving cases.
C. Typological Distinctions and Lenity
If Chevron should generally displace lenity as an interpretive tool, is there nonetheless
room to argue that this presumption should be reversed for certain classes of cases? For instance,
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could deportation provisions be dealt with differently than other immigration provisions, such that
lenity may be a relevant consideration in the former category but not the latter? Versions of this
argument have been raised. In Torres, the alien argued that the immigration rule of lenity “does
not apply in all immigration cases; it applies only where deportation would be a consequence. In
other immigration matters, the BIA is entitled to deference when it reasonably interprets
ambiguities in the INA.”299 This argument seeks to take a middle ground, recognizing the
applicability of Chevron to immigration cases (thus avoiding the absurdity of arguing against
Supreme Court practice), while nonetheless contending that deference is not warranted where the
immediate consequence of the provision being interpreted is removal from the United States.
Cabining lenity in this fashion may have intuitive appeal, but it is nonetheless problematic for at
least two reasons.
First, the foundation of deference to the agency’s interpretation of the immigration laws is
Congress’s express provision that the Attorney General’s ruling on all question of law shall be
controlling300 There is no basis for parsing the plain text of this provision and concluding that it
is controlling for most determinations under the immigration laws, but not controlling as to certain
other determinations. This is especially true where the inadmissibility and deportation grounds
are at the very heart of the INA and the system established by that statute. Carving them out of
the class of interpretations that would be entitled to deference on review makes little structural
sense. Disentangling deportation and inadmissibility grounds from other provisions would also be
close to impossible, considering that many of the grounds of removability double as eligibility
criteria.301 If lenity dictated one interpretation for purposes of deportation and another for purposes
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of relief, there would be statutory anarchy, to say nothing about the impermissibility of bipartite
interpretations of single terms or provisions of a statute.302 But if the default then became “lenity
controls,” deference over large swaths of the INA would be eliminated, including over many or
most relief provisions; the cabined version of lenity could quickly result in the wholesale
importation of the concept. Finally, there is a conceptual disconnect between the cabined-version
of lenity and reality—in removal and relief cases, the same stakes are at issue. Interpretation of
the removal provision may more immediately affect (in the sense of directly controlling) the alien’s
removability, but interpretation and application of the INA’s relief and protection provisions has
the same consequence. Denial of relief or protection from removal entails removal. In other
words, the distinction between deportation as such, and the relief and protection provisions of the
INA, is less significant than first meets the eye.
Second, Supreme Court practice does not support the distinction. Although the rule is
phrased in terms of “strict construction of deportation statutes,”303 the use of the term “deportation”
seems more like a shorthand for “immigration.” Before Chevron, lenity was mentioned in cases
presenting both issues of deportability and relief, and there was no difference in how the rule was
stated or “applied.”304 After Chevron, too, it has been mentioned in both classes of cases with no
distinction as to its applicability, i.e., that it would be applicable in the deportation context but not
in the relief context.305 If there is in fact an immigration rule of lenity with substantive content, it
would seemingly apply to the immigration laws writ large—the INA as a whole—and not only to
specific portions thereof. There is no warrant for a more specific targeting of subparts of the INA
for lenity while otherwise employing deference principles. Lenity and deference present all-ornothing propositions, and it is lenity that should come out the loser in that contest.
D. The Unnecessity of Lenity
The Supreme Court, given the appropriate case, should “kill[] and bur[y]” the immigration
rule of lenity, rather than allow it to continue to “stalk” the Court’s immigration jurisprudence.306
The rule has always been irrelevant to the decisions the Court issued, but its rationale was on some
level supported by a semblance of conceptual sense: in cases of statutory ambiguity where the
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Court needed a tie-breaker, the rule of lenity provided additional cover for adopting one
interpretation of the immigration laws rather than another. The criminal rule of lenity survives in
some form today because it continues to serve that same purpose in the context of a court’s
interpretation of penal statutes. In contrast, the immigration-rule-of-lenity is an anachronism
whose conceptual underpinnings were demolished with Chevron’s advent.307 The role previously
served by the rule, at least rhetorically, has now been delegated to the Attorney General acting
through his delegates.
Will the rule’s funeral mark a change in the Supreme Court’s immigration jurisprudence?
Of course not; there is no colorable argument that cases will be decided any differently than they
have in the nearly four decades since Chevron was decided. In no decision decided in that
timeframe did the rule provide even a relevant component of the Court’s decision in an
immigration case, let alone the actual dispositive basis for decision. And that reality charts the
longer history of the rule, where it was never dispositive and at best a lite thumb on the scales for
an interpretation around which a majority had otherwise coalesced. As an unnecessary rule of
decision in the last four decades, it is highly unlikely to have had any effect in future cases.
This is especially true where the purposes of lenity can be adequately realized within the
Chevron framework. The immigration rule of lenity was premised in part on the harshness of
deportation,308 but even accepting that framing the harshness was not itself the raison d’etre of the
rule. Lenity was not required at the threshold to allow an alien to avoid deportation simply because
the statute could contemplate a lenient interpretation, just as the criminal rule of lenity is not
applied at the beginning as a tool for mitigating application of the penal laws.309 The immigration
rule of lenity, like the similar criminal rule, was meant to ensure that the courts did not stray into
territory that was the province of the legislative branch.310 It would not contemplate deportation
in circumstances where it was not clear that Congress would have intended, with the statutory
provision it enacted, that result.311 Chevron changes the scope of the territory the courts should be
respecting; once it may have been solely the prerogative of Congress acting through legislation to
establish discrete and specific criteria to govern all immigration questions, but that is no longer
true today and has not been for decades. Immigration law is a collaborative work between the
legislative and executive branches, with the judiciary playing referee. The framing of the
immigration rule of lenity as trying to protect against arbitrary determinations regarding
deportation can still serve as a guide on judicial review, but deference does alter the scope of a
court’s authority to consider that factor. This concern, however, can be adequately considered
within the existing Chevron framework.
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At step-one of Chevron, courts can simply take a harder look at the statutory language in
conjunction with other relevant tools of statutory construction to distill a plain meaning of the
statute. As Justice Kennedy bemoaned in Pereira, “some Courts of Appeals [have] engaged in
cursory analysis of the question whether, applying the ordinary tools of statutory construction,
Congress’ intent could be discerned[.]”312 Eschewing such “reflexive deference” would propel the
courts into a deeper review of relevant materials, thus minimizing the need to defer to agency
interpretations while ensuring that most cases are resolved on “plain meaning” grounds, i.e.,
grounds that arguably better track the legislative intent (or at least legislative text). The Court’s
decision in Pereira itself cannot be explained on other grounds; as Justice Alito accurately noted
in his solo dissent, the majority’s decision effectively imposed a “better reading” on the statute in
derogation of basic principles of deference.313 The decision in Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions is
also on par; the Court effectively concluded that the term “sexual abuse of a minor” is clear enough
regarding certain applications, i.e., in not encompassing statutory rape offenses in states where the
age of majority is sixteen or seventeen, but potentially still ambiguous on other applications,
including statutes with the same age of consent but that also include elements evincing a power
dynamic between the victim and abuser.314 As the Court explicitly noted in that case, resolving
the question on that basis allowed it to avoid any question of how deference or lenity should
apply.315
Consideration of Pereira and Esquivel-Quintana should not give one too-rosy a view as to
how a harder look may benefit aliens. The interpretations adopted in both cases did ultimately
benefit the alien seeking to avoid removal, but it is just as likely that the plain meaning of the
statute will foreclose relief or support deportation. That is the result the Court came to in both
Torres and Kawashima, upholding interpretations of the INA’s aggravated felony provision that
entailed the deportation of the petitioners in those cases.316 It is also the conclusion the Court
reached more recently in Barton v. Barr, upholding a strict interpretation of the cancellation-ofremoval provision’s stop-time rule,317 as well as the earlier cases, Phinpathya and Hector.318 To
be sure, then, a harder look is not a benefit to one party or the other. But neither the alien nor the
government have any claim to a more lenient (or stricter) interpretation that would be in derogation
of the plain meaning of the statute, established by resort to traditional tools of statutory
construction.319 The only point is that under Chevron’s existing framework, and undertaking the
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more searching review of plain meaning advocated by Justice Kennedy, the “purpose” of lenity
would be served, as the alien would only be deportable or ineligible for relief on the ground that
Congress intended that exact result.
Step-two of Chevron ultimately provides a similar safeguard, rejecting interpretations that
are arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. If the agency has rendered such a determination, then
the proper course is for the reviewing court to vacate the decision and remand. The Supreme Court
took this tack in Judulang v. Holder, overturning agency precedent for assessing a deportable
alien’s eligibility for relief under former Section 212(c) of the INA.320 There, the Court concluded
that “[b]y hinging a deportable alien’s eligibility for discretionary relief on the chance
correspondence between statutory categories—a matter irrelevant to the alien’s fitness to reside in
this country—the BIA has failed to exercise its discretion in a reasoned manner.” 321 And in
Mellouli v. Lynch, the Court rejected deference, holding that the Board’s interpretation of the
relevant removability provision made “scant sense.”322 As already noted, the Court made a similar
move in Negusie¸ holding that the Board had improperly deemed itself bound by Supreme Court
precedent in construing the persecutor-bar, finding that interpretation unreasonable for that reason,
and remanding for further proceedings.323
Again, reasonableness will ensure that aliens are not removed or denied relief on spurious
grounds. And in retrospect, this would have been sufficient to forestall any rhetorical resort to
lenity in the foundational cases. In Degladillo, for instance, it would have been easy to construe
an agency interpretation of “entry” as encompassing an involuntary shipwreck and temporary stay
in the country of rescue as arbitrary and capricious. Whatever other interpretive discretion the
agency could have in construing that term, that would not be a reasonable reading entitled to
deference. Likewise in Fong Haw Tan—an interpretation of the twice-sentenced language as
encompassing only a single indictment and sentencing would not have passed muster under
Chevron. There may still have been some leeway for the agency to interpret the term contrary to
the Court’s holding in Fong Haw Tan, for instance, in accord with the Fourth Circuit’s holding
that the statute required distinct criminal occurrences and separate sentences for each, but not
necessarily a second sentencing hearing. But that would not have changed the Court’s rejection
of the Ninth Circuit’s decision. In the end, the reasonableness requirement of Chevron tempers
the limits of agency discretion in construing the immigration laws, permitting only those
interpretations that are reasonable. This is an adequate safeguard against the harshness of
deportation.
CONCLUSION
The immigration rule of lenity should be interred as a vestige of a bygone era, irrelevant to
contemporary judicial review of immigration law. Rooted in shaky jurisprudential grounds and
always a bridesmaid, never a bride, insofar as resolving cases has been concerned, any relevance
for the rule disappeared in 1984 with Chevron. Rather than continue to countenance the rule’s
ghoulish existence, stalking argumentation before the Supreme Court, the Court should simply put
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to rest what seems firmly established on a clear-eyed review of the rule’s history: the rule is a
myth, a rhetorical device turned to in order to support interpretations otherwise firmly rooted in
application of traditional tools of statutory construction. Instead of the paeans advocates have
grown use to periodically paying, the rule deserves only an elegy.
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